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City governments and other public-sector bodies are looking for new contractual 
solutions and management methods to improve the construction and refurbish-
ment of urban infrastructure and public service facilities. Traditional public invest-
ments have been straightforward public procurements, where a public body orders 
project work and a construction company delivers only what is agreed in a building 
contract. Because of the aims of the European Single Market (ESM) and the reg-
ulation of public procurement, public authorities typically grant these contracts 
via standardised methods of competitive tendering to a company able to bid with 
the lowest price. 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and especially private finance initiatives 
(PFIs) have challenged traditional models of public investment projects since 
the 1990s, when they were seen as radically new types of building contract. In PPPs 
and PFIs, private-sector organisations accept wider duties and sign longer commit-
ments than in classical projects, as the companies do not only construct a physical 
object but also take care of its maintenance for a fixed period of time, as agreed 
in a contract. However, the basic contractual settings defining a public body 
as a purchaser and a private company as a producer are the same in PPPs and PFIs 
as they are in traditional investment projects. 
Recently, an entirely new project concept called an alliance model has emerged, 
developed in Australia and emphasising close collaboration between contract par-
ties. As the model is still a new scheme of operations and not well-known in Euro-
pean urban contexts, there is a knowledge gap regarding the features and challenges 
of this new concept. 
We studied the alliance model as a new project concept by reviewing stake-
holder views of urban public investment projects in order to deepen understanding 
about the critical success factors associated with the introduction and application 
of this collaboration-based building contract and project scheme. We evaluated 
the emergence of the alliance model in Finland in order to explain how it differs 
from other project models and why it is gaining popularity. Our analyses revealed 
some national aspects of the development of the building industry and difficulties 








We also performed an empirical case study of two urban alliance projects based 
on original research data. The aim of the case study was to demonstrate the prem-
ises and noteworthy interpretations of projects in the City of Tampere, Finland and 
highlight the features of the phases of the alliances. The studied alliance projects 
included a highway tunnel project in the urban context and a light rail service pro-
ject representing an entirely new form of urban public transit in the country.
Analytical Framework of the Study 
Alternative Methods of Public Investment Projects: Traditional 
Construction Projects and Partnership Contracts
A public-sector construction and investment project can be organised in many ways 
and it is not possible to review them all here. It is not always effectively possible 
for public-sector organisations to run “make or buy” pre-considerations in order 
to evaluate the politically and economically expedient execution of a project, since 
they tend to operate without the necessary in-house construction capacity and fi-
nancial capabilities. Consequently, public bodies usually purchase construction 
projects from external providers using standardised and established contracts. 
Figure 1 illustrates the main contract types of public investment projects. All-in, 
or design-build, projects, include typically only a single contract between a public 
authority and a company that will take care of all design and construction works. 
The benefit of this type of contract is that as public authorities have to establish 
only one contractual relationship with a company capable of designing and build-
ing a construction object, it can minimise coordination problems between design 
and construction works. In design-bid-build projects, planning duties are procured 
from a design office and construction works are outsourced to a construction com-
pany. These projects enable public authorities to organise two separate calls for bids 
and procure architectural design and construction works from specialised enter-
prises. The third main type of traditional public investment projects is a project 
management contract. This is a relatively novel application where public authorities 
let a project management company manage the investment project via outsourced 
piecework contracts enabling the authorities to make many contractual choices 
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Figure 1. Main procurement methods of public sector investment projects. 
A public-private partnership (PPP) is an alternative method of carrying out 
a public investment project even though the partnership concept is a contested 
and ambiguous term (see e.g. Powell and Glendinning; Carnwell and Carson). For 
example, Savas has studied the use of the PPP concept and claimed that for wider 
political acceptance, some interest groups that want to promote stronger private-
sector involvement in the delivery of public projects use the term instead of priva-
tisation. Given that the PPP concept is extensively used but vaguely defined, in this 
study a PPP is understood as one of the main types of public investment projects, 
referring to a long-term collaboration between public authorities and private-sector 
organisations that allocates more responsibilities to the private organisations than 
is the case in traditional public investments. 
PPP contracts are classified into two main categories: private finance initiatives 
(PFIs) and life-cycle models. A PFI refers to an investment contract between public 
authorities and private companies that aims to deliver the funding, construction, 
renovation, management or maintenance of public infrastructure. A PFI contract 
is a specific form of a PPP, including remarkable upfront and long-term private 
funding of an investment project that the public sector needs (D’Alessandro, Bailey 
and Giorgino). A life-cycle model is quite similar to PFI with the key difference 
that the procurement authorities take care of the funding of a project. Table 1 dem-
onstrates the differences between these main types of investment contracts. 
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PFI models have not been very popular in Finland. Finland’s public finances 
have been relatively stable over a long period, and the central government has been 
able to borrow money from the global financial market with relatively low costs, 
more recently with a negative interest rate. A few years ago, public finances faced 
stronger difficulties and, in 2014 and 2015, Finland’s credit rating was downgraded 
to the second-best level (i.e. AA+). So far, local authorities have also had relatively 
good possibilities to fund their investment projects via local budgets. Local authori-
ties have wide taxation powers, including a local income tax and a property tax, and 
the legal and actual capacity to borrow money from the national and international 
financial markets. They have thus been able to arrange municipal funding for their 
projects. To secure these capacities and pool the financial needs of individual local 
authorities, the local government sector (i.e. the municipalities jointly) has established 
a special financial institution (Municipal Finance PLC). This has enjoyed the same 
credit rating as the Finnish state government, which means that it has been capable of 
providing cheaply priced loans to local authorities. It has thus been an effective com-
petitor to the banking sector in financing municipalities’ projects (Valkama et al.). 
In the near future, it seems that interest rates, expectedly remaining very low, favour 
further public debt financing even though they include risk of over-indebtedness. 
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An Alliance Model as a New Project Type
In private-sector business studies, strategic alliances are considered as contractual 
or ownership-based arrangements between companies involving exchange, sharing, 
or co-development of products or services (Gulati; Boone and Ivanov; D’Alessandro 
et al.). D’Alessandro, Bailey and Giorgino have stated that strategic alliances are 
long-term inter-company arrangements, where alliance parties have shared control 
mechanisms. They work in proactive ways to integrate the contribution of resources 
and skills by both partners and have common risk-sharing and -bearing methods 
in place. Based on these arguments, they have also claimed that a standard PPP/
PFI is not a strategic alliance since there are no aligned strategic interests and joint 
entities. 
In public investment projects, an alliance is typically defined as a legal contract 
of cooperation between a public authority as a customer and one or more private 
companies as service provider(s) with the purpose to carry out one or more public 
work projects via collaboration (Jefferies et al.). According to Lahdenperä, a project 
alliance is a contractual delivery method where project parties commit themselves 
to shared responsibilities in order to design and construct public facilities or infra-
structures, where the parties create a joint organisation or joint venture and where 
the parties share both negative and positive risks while cooperating closely and 
sharing information. He claims that key structural features of project alliances are 
joint agreements, joint organisation and risk-sharing arrangements. 
Allying is a form of managing construction cooperation between two or more 
organisations which agree on a shared goal and commit to working together to per-
form a specific building project. This is generally considered enough to distinguish 
allying from standard public procurement projects. It aims at achieving more unity 
of purpose between contractual parties. In standard procurement and outsourc-
ing commitments, the contract parties maintain organisational independence, but 
in alliances they have to give up some of their autonomy. To compensate for the re-
duced autonomy, the parties of an alliance expect to get some particular return 
on association or value added. 
In traditional investment and PPP projects, the parties agree on a fixed or 
maximum contract price, but in alliance projects, the procedure is different. First, 
the parties define a target cost including a protocol on profit margins. After the pro-
ject is fully completed, the parties share the profits or losses. Second, the alliance 
parties identify possible risks before they come up and commit to managing them 
jointly. Third, alliances are formed through a careful and long selection process re-
quiring participants to commit themselves to a win-win mind-set (Jefferies, Brewer 
& Gajendran). Alliance parties have to equalise their negotiation powers and agree 
on a method of consensus-based decision-making since the possibility of litigation 
is excluded unless there are clear cases of competence deficit or criminal activity. 
63
ToAllyorNot?
Trust, transparency, joint working and open communication are the often-quoted 
key success factors in alliance projects (Walker and Jacobsson). Table 2 illustrates 
these and other success factors of alliance projects. 
Table 2. Critical success factors in alliance projects (n.b. the cells of the two columns are in random 
order, with no intended correspondence among their contents on a cell-to-cell scale).
Critical factors identified by a literature 
review (Jefferies, Brewer and Gajendra)
Critical factors identified by an 






















The potential benefits of an alliance project are casual or nebulous: close and 
unprejudiced joint working between the contract parties, a best-for-project spirit, 
more open knowledge-sharing practices, opportunities for learning, increased 
communication, more open active media relations, and decreased blaming and 
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disputing (Walker and Jacobsson). One obvious challenge with the alliance model 
is that it is not easy to find fit-for-purpose alliance members and build shared un-
derstanding and commitments. Because of these issues, an alliance project requires 
quite time-consuming and possibly difficult preparation measures before an alli-
ance contract is ready to be signed (Walker and Jacobsson). 
Theoretical Perspectives on Collaboration in Construction 
Projects
The New Public Management (NPM) discourse promoted the use of business-like 
management practices in public services via marketisation and quasi-market solu-
tions. However, these kinds of aspirations are not highly relevant in public con-
struction projects since the project models and the market structures of the indus-
try have traditionally been very competitive. The classic regeneration of the capa-
bilities of the construction industry has happened via competitive tendering based 
on open and transparent public procurements, but those construction companies 
which cannot bid the lowest prices are not able to get new contracts and, economic 
theory states, in the end they are excluded from the market via bankruptcy. From 
the Schumpeterian perspective, this is a crucial element of the economic process of 
“creative destruction” (Schumpeter qtd. in Aghion & Howitt 2).
A construction project is typically a labour-intensive process where a construc-
tion company combines building materials, building automation technologies and 
soil to create new infrastructures and facilities. These assemblages turn out real 
estates that, in turn, constitute vital linkages between architecture as a form of art 
and urban development as a policy goal (Martin et al.). Besides competition impli-
cations, the dynamic advancement of projects depends on how public authorities 
are able to draft building contracts, collaborate with construction companies, and 
encourage the companies to make their best efforts during the contract duration. 
The contract parties of a building project can agree and sign their commitments 
through a classical or relational contract as described in Table 3. If the building 
contract is used purely as a classical legal document, it guides the parties’ ful-
filment of only the precise contractual requirements, eliminating the scope for 
extensive collaboration, but the public sector has long and extensive experience 
with traditional contracts, making their use easy and safe. Public-sector bodies 
are heavily regulated organisations based on the requirements of the rule of law, 
budget discipline, and the Weberian tradition of public bureaucracy; therefore, it 




Table 3. Alternative types of contract: opposite interpretations (Palmer Mills; Morelli; Bevir; Romzek 
and Johnston).
ASPECTS CLASSICAL CONTRACTS RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
Style of contacting Highlyformalistic Lessformal
Parties Anonymous Well-known
Interests Divergent Common



























Decision on disputes Litigation Mutualnegotiations
As relational contracting leaves space to adjust the terms of the contract dur-
ing its duration, it is often understood as a platform for social learning and dia-
logue. Relational norms facilitate cooperation and knowledge-sharing that enable 
the parties to generate inventions and improvements throughout the duration of 
the contract. However, public-sector organisations in their classical form have been 
poorly incentivised to move to the inevitable risk-taking associated with relational 
contracts (Vincent-Jones). The “innovation paradox” in public investment projects 
can be unfolded as follows. While the pressures that call for efficiency and produc-
tivity improvements guide public authorities to be flexible, proactive and creative 
with their contractual parties, they hesitate to work that way because of the strong 
imperatives for standardised contractual policies. The classical virtues of public 
administration always tend to prioritise predefined, neutral and distant administra-
tive behaviour instead (Veenswijk). 
However, sometimes collaborative approaches and practices are also overesti-
mated. Contractual settings may not always be free from complications but, in-
stead, be infested with contradictions. The theory of collaborative advantage has 
conceptualised the nature of collaborative arrangements by reviewing complexi-
ties that frame collaborative situations. The fundamental assumption of the col-
laborative advantage focuses on synergies by pointing out that collaboration may 
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deliver some benefits that will remain beyond the reach of any of the collaborative 
(or, in this case, non-collaborative) organisations acting alone. However, according 
to the theory, collaborative arrangements include inertia and they may even fail 
due to interfering opposite interests or managerial insufficiencies (Huxham). 
In analysing collaborative advantages and inertia, the focus should be on a col-
laboration’s structure, communication processes and leadership actors (Vangen 
and Huxham). Structural issues relate to the contractual parties (including both 
organisations and their individual representatives) and their formal ties. Process 
perspectives focus on the instruments and methods of communication and de-
cision-making applied in a project. Leadership actors are those participants who 
have influential powers and skills to fine-tune a collaboration’s agenda (Vangen 
et al.). 
Data and Methods
Our empirical study consists of two significant urban alliance projects in Finland: 
The Tampere highway tunnel and the Tampere light rail project. Both of these are 
urban public investments co-funded by the city and the state government. The Tam-
pere highway tunnel project is already finished, with the tunnel opened for traffic 
on November 15, 2016. The Tunnel Alliance was composed of the City of Tampere, 
the Finnish Transport Agency, and a team of private companies (Lemminkäinen 
Infra Ltd, Saanio & Riekkola Ltd, and A-Insinöörit Suunnittelu Ltd). 
The first phase of the Tampere light rail project was accepted in Tampere City 
Council on November 7, 2016: “The Tramway Alliance is composed of the City of 
Tampere, VR Track Ltd, YIT Construction Services Ltd, Pöyry Finland PLC and, 
by means of a sub-alliance contract, Ratatek Ltd. During the development phase, 
the Tramway Alliance prepared a detailed implementation plan of the tracks, street 
planning, stops and depot. The plan’s aim was to find the best feasible solutions 
to support the construction decision” (City of Tampere, “Tramway” online) Accord-
ing to the City of Tampere, the light rail system project includes intentions to have 
a continuous dialogue with residents, communities, businesses, and property own-
ers (City of Tampere, “Tramway” online). 
We collected primary data through face-to-face interviews, interviewing the key 
people of the mentioned alliance projects in February 2017. The interviewed people 
represented the city government and the Finnish Transport Agency. Furthermore, 
we interviewed one external expert who worked as a special advisor on these pro-
jects. The interviewed people and interview dates were:
 — CEO, urban development, City of Tampere, Feb 7, 2017
 — Manager in the Finnish Transport Agency, Feb 17, 2107
 — Development manager, City of Tampere, Feb 6, 2017
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 — Expert consultant, Vison Ltd, Feb 17, 2017
The semi-structured interviews lasted from 40 to 90 minutes. We recorded 
the interview sessions and transcribed them for further analysis.
The planning phase of the highway tunnel project had started in the City Hall 
in 2011. Our interviews regarding this project were focused on the fact that it was, 
at the time of the interviews, an entirely executed project. In contrast, the Tampere 
light rail project was at the beginning of the implementation phase in the winter 
and early spring of 2017, even if the light rail development programme and devel-
opment project that preceded it had been working for some years already. Hence, 
the interviews regarding this project emphasised the features of an unfinished pro-
ject and its span of implementation and learning curve still underway.
As secondary data, the research team collected and analysed documentary ma-
terials, including state government and municipal project reports. We reviewed 
the governmental value-for-money reports on the alliance projects in order to dis-
cover and summarise officially documented and confirmed project aspirations and 
experiences.
Research Findings
Background of the Emergence of Urban Alliances 
Problems of the Construction Industry
In the early 1990s, the Finnish economy faced exceptional problems. The national 
economy had experienced a finance-led boom in the late 1980s, with the result that 
after a few years the entire economy overheated. That inflated a bubble of prop-
erty prices, among other growth effects. A key institutional “merit” of the boom 
was the too-fast and unplanned liberalisation of the Finnish banking sector that 
resulted in severe competition for market share between the banks. Banks also 
lent money recklessly to construction projects, with many of them ending up in fi-
nancial misery. The state government had to bail out the banking sector, the price 
bubble burst, and the Finnish economy plunged into deep recession. 
As both public and private-sector organisations stopped and cancelled many of 
their investment plans in the early 1990s, construction companies saw their markets 
collapsing. Many of their previously important customers and projects were gone 
for good. The construction industry fell into abysmal financial difficulties, which 
instigated dramatic changes in the whole management culture of the industry. 
Some traditional companies went bankrupt, and some companies were sold to for-
eign ownership. The surviving construction companies made huge redundancies by 
firing their regular professional staff members (expert consultant). 
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One of the key managerial changes in the industry was the introduction of new 
outsourcing methods that included many sub-contracting procedures. The value 
chains of the construction projects were chopped into small pieces as the main 
contracting company outsourced individual working phases to small companies via 
numerous sub-contracts. As a result, construction projects changed their original 
nature and started to include long contract chains and many project participants. 
According to the expert consultant, these developments ended up in many disputes 
and claims between the contracting parties. As he saw it, these developments cre-
ated many disappointments and frustrations among project stakeholders. 
Industrial scientists and economists have considered service sectors as a sinkhole 
of the economy, immune to significant productivity improvements (Zysman et al.). 
According to Baumol’s “Cost Disease” hypothesis, the productivity of service sec-
tors is either unchanged or grows only very slowly when compared with the scope 
for innovation in the manufacturing sector. Many investors and analysts considered 
the Finnish construction industry in the same way and associated it with serious 
productivity problems (Ronkainen). 
The expert consultant claimed that productivity improvements were difficult 
to promote in the industry since the companies operated in old-fashioned ways with-
out a user-centred approach. According to the expert consultant, public authorities 
were often disappointed with the infrastructure and construction projects they pro-
cured. The final products of the projects were often contrary to their actual wishes. 
His claims are supported by a recent study undertaken for the Finnish Cabinet of 
Ministers about government construction projects, of which a considerable part end 
up in delays and cost overruns (Virtanen). These findings are similar to many inter-
national research findings demonstrating that classical construction projects have 
often suffered overrun cost overruns and delays (Walker and Jacobsson). 
In order to summarise the observations made by the expert consultant, who ac-
tively followed the construction industry and participated in development projects, 
it has to be noted that during the last few decades “frustrated” has been a term that 
well-describes many stakeholder experiences of public investment projects dur-
ing the last few decades. After these experiences, some developers and industry 
leaders have demonstrated at least an implicit readiness to search for and apply 
alternative methods of project management. However, many of them lacked specific 
ideas on how to make improvements before getting familiar with a management 
doctrine that emerged during the post-recession years. This doctrine, lean manage-
ment, was their key to studying international experiences of how to renew contract 
management policies. The expert consultant claimed that nowadays the modern 
representatives of the Finnish construction industry increasingly understand their 
operations as a service industry that needs to listen to its customers more carefully 
than before – and find ways to co-create values with the procuring authorities 
in public construction projects.
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The First Alliance Project in Europe
Although the Finnish municipalities have strong local self-government and wide 
general powers, municipal decision-makers hesitate to launch experiments in in-
vestment projects which include high risks. In Finland, the state government has 
been the forerunner in efforts to renew procurement and contract practices in in-
frastructure undertakings. The Finnish Transport Agency, a government-controlled 
national authority, was the first public agency to sign a PFI contract in the country 
in 1997. The agency volunteered to work as a pathbreaker and a role model for other 
public bodies, and afterwards, a few city governments followed it by launching some 
local PFI projects (Valkama et al.).
The Transport Agency was the first Finnish public authority to introduce an al-
liance model in a public infrastructure project. This was a reconstruction project of 
a 90 km railway line (Lielahti–Kokemäki) with a budget of around 100 million €. It 
was completed between 2011 and 2015. According to the agency (Liikennevirasto), 
it launched the railway project as a pilot project in order to test and collect experi-
ences. The agency claims it was the first alliance project in Europe. 
Role of the Transport Agency in the Tampere Alliance Projects
The role of the Transport Agency has also been remarkably important in the alli-
ance projects launched in the city of Tampere. Soon after the national railway alli-
ance was introduced, the agency wanted to test it in an urban infrastructure project 
and recommended that the alliance concept was suitable for the Tampere highway 
tunnel project, co-funded by the state and the City of Tampere. As the City Hall 
authorised the agency to apply the alliance contract and take the role of the project 
leader in the highway tunnel project, the agency became its procuring authority. 
The agency was confident in the alliance concept: the railway project was an encour-
aging reference since the construction works completed ahead of time and the real-
ised costs were less than the estimated ones (Rantatunneli; Liikennevirasto).
In the Tampere light rail construction project, the Tramway Alliance, the city 
government is the leading and procuring authority. Before launching the light 
rail development project, the city government evaluated the best contract concept 
to manage the project, comparing the all-in, life-cycle and alliance models. The city 
decided to apply the alliance model, especially because it did not yet have ready-
made technical plans for the project. The alliance concept gave time to prepare 
the project plans and flexibility to finalise technical details after the first phase of 
the alliance project had started. The development manager emphasised that from 
the perspective of a city government, the alliance concept is only one project con-




The state government and the Transport Agency are still important players 
in the Tampere light rail development process, now firmly in the construction 
phase. The state government is a co-funding body providing 30% of the estimated 
cost, and the Transport Agency has nominated a representative (a senior manager 
in the agency) to work as a member of the Tramway Alliance board of managers, 
even though they do not have a voting right in the board (Raitiotieallianssi). 
Phases of the Studied Alliance Projects
In the alliance projects launched so far in the city of Tampere, three main phases 
can be discerned: 1) initiation, 2) development and 3) implementation. The initia-
tion phase is a search process for service provider candidates, where the interested 
service providers are screened with a preliminary negotiation phase. Here, the best 
potential candidates are identified to enter the actual negotiation phase. The nego-
tiation phase ends up with the choice of the best partner for the planning and con-
struction works. Like with any choices when public funds are allocated to external 
organisations, the initiation phase has to fit the requirements of the regulation of 
public procurements. They require transparent and neutral treatment of candidate 
companies. 
The development phase continues with the chosen partners. This phase is very in-
tensive and time-consuming. All in all, the initiation and development phases con-
sume more time than the comparable preparation phase in traditional investment 
or PPP projects. The alliance model requires a careful search process to find good 
partners at the personal level. Simultaneously, creating the team spirit requires ef-
forts to enable the creation of preconditions for the successful execution of the due 
planning and development duties. These phases can last one year or longer, depend-
ing on the complexities and size of a project, but they are necessary preparations 
for a successful implementation phase.
The interviewed CEO of urban development emphasised the importance of the de-
velopment phase. It is not only finding the “good guys” to become partners but also 
building trust between those partners. This requires laborious negotiations and 
working on acceptable agreements for all parties. Another very important feature 
of the development effort is to keep possible disagreements inside the development 
group and not bring them out in public during the ongoing development phase. 
The development phase must also produce a plan that is acceptable to the City 
decision-making bodies, the Executive Board and, finally, the Council.
A key result of all interviews is easy to summarise. The informants considered 
a success in the development phase’s creation of team spirit as a crucial precondi-
tion for the later success of the alliance model. Not only was this highlighted in our 
interviews, but it can also be discerned from the following citation from the Tunnel 
plan of the Alliance:
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The composition of the Alliance in the development phase will be kept unchanged 
as far as possible in the implementation phase, to ensure that the Alliance ethos, coopera-
tion and approved practices created in the development phase are transferred to the im-
plementation phase. The Alliance organisation will grow substantially during the imple-
mentation phase along with the construction organisation. (Tampere Highway Tunnel 
Alliance project, Project Plan by the Alliance Executive Team 6)
The interview with the manager from the Finnish Transport Agency brought out 
how important it was for the Tunnel Alliance to reach unanimous decisions during 
the planning phase and for all parties to agree on common goals and a target price 
for the project. In our interview, the City of Tampere development director empha-
sised that the way of processing the project with the alliance model brought several 
advantages, such as innovative cost savings and shorter planning and implemen-
tation times. An example of an innovative cost-saving action was an intersecting 
bridge that was originally planned to be built from scratch. It was changed to being 
consolidated on the foundations of an already existing bridge. The joint planning 
phase with all partners involved was appraised to result in a time-saving of over one 
year, possibly up to two years, compared with a traditional contract workflow.
One reason for the smooth implementation and the desire to co-operate was 
the well-thought and generally agreed-upon incentive system that guaranteed 
that time and cost savings benefitted all parties. Good incentive systems included 
an agreement on the division of risks between the parties. Thus, some of the en-
countered risks were tackled together by the whole Alliance, some by the construc-
tor and some by the City as the end-user.
Evaluating the Urban Alliance Projects
The Transport Agency (Liikennevirasto) published an evaluation report on the rail-
way project, demonstrating very positive experiences. Lahdenperä has published 
a schematic and conceptual list of potential benefits and weaknesses of alliance 
projects. His key theses are summarised in Table 4. 
Our empirical findings on the alliance models in the City of Tampere give sup-
port especially to benefits 3–5, 7 and 9–10. The interviews also revealed that the top 
managers of the city were very committed and experienced personal satisfaction 
in the successful alliance way of working (number 8). So far, the experiences of 
these two City Alliance projects have confronted hardly any of the threats, accord-
ing to the interviews. Threats or weaknesses 6 and 7 were experienced, but they 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The interviewed stakeholders and analysed documents considered that the alliance 
model of a building contract is a potential solution for some of the chronic problems 
of the building industry such as low productivity development and project disputes, 
and the disappointments of public-sector investment projects such as delays and 
cost overruns. As the model is new and not well-known, the national transport 
agency has played a pivotal role in efforts to introduce and establish the alliance 
model at the national and urban levels. For example, the Transport Agency sum-
marised the international experiences of the model, implemented the first national 
alliance project, and managed the first urban alliance project on behalf of the city 
of Tampere. 
Our empirical case study focused on the premises and phases of the investigated 
alliance projects which the City of Tampere launched as the Finnish forerunner. 
To highlight its importance, the model, the experiences and the contracting part-
ners of the Tampere light rail process are in a key role in the large-scale light rail 
constructions in their inception phase in Helsinki region in 2019. The implement-
ed alliance models included initiation, development and implementation phases. 
The interviewed experts named the development phase as particularly critical. 
The phase is very intensive and time-consuming, because team spirit, shared ethos, 
and joint goals are created in that phase before the construction works and actual 
collaboration can be initiated. 
The interview data and document analyses give a reason to conclude that there 
are some noteworthy preconditions which have to be fulfilled before favouring 
an alliance model instead of traditional or partnership projects becomes worth-
while. First, public authorities need to be able to fund the project through public 
finance. Second, public authorities must be ready to give a fair degree of autonomy 
to an alliance project by delegating some decision-making powers to an alliance 
team. Third, our interviewees emphasised that the alliance projects must be big 
enough, about EUR 30–35 million in the Finnish context. Governments around 
the world have developed criteria for when it is appropriate to consider an alli-
ance model as an option in an investment project. For example, the Queensland 
State Government uses the alliance model as a default concept in projects that 
have a construction duration of more than 12 months or a value of not less than 
A$10 million (i.e. approximately EUR 7.5 million) (Jefferies et al.).
If city governments have ready-made plans for a project, they should also have 
the best possibility to compare the alternative procurement methods of public-
sector investment projects presented in Figure 1. The expert consultant interviewed 
explained that the PFI concept was not applicable in the Tampere light rail project 
since the city was not able to finalise their plans early enough. Another informant 
stated that projects containing several ambiguous factors and confronting a high 
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probability of surprises are suitable for being managed through an alliance con-
tract that allows more degrees of freedom in situations where flexibility is needed. 
However, the alliance process itself includes and even requires a more intensive 
and laborious development phase. With lesser complexity, smaller and technically 
simpler projects fit very well within and can be effectively managed through an all-
in contract. 
The main methodological limitation of the case study is that our major findings 
are country- and city-specific. However, the experiences of the Tampere alliances 
are valuable, nevertheless, for sketching the Finnish alliance landscape. Their scale 
is indicative: both the tunnel and light rail projects are very large and multiannual 
public works. Further studies should elaborate on the research questions, lengthen 
the number and periods of alliance projects, and look for possibilities to diversify 
the empirical data. This would obviously give opportunities to draw deeper and 
more persuasive conclusions on the functioning of the new alliance model in dif-
ferent circumstances.
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